Recent works have shown the effectiveness of randomized smoothing as a scalable technique for building neural network-based classifiers that are provably robust to 2 -norm adversarial perturbations. In this paper, we employ adversarial training to improve the performance of randomized smoothing. We design an adapted attack for smoothed classifiers, and we show how this attack can be used in an adversarial training setting to boost the provable robustness of smoothed classifiers. We demonstrate through extensive experimentation that our method consistently outperforms all existing provably 2 -robust classifiers by a significant margin on ImageNet and CIFAR-10, establishing the state-of-the-art for provable 2 -defenses. Our code and trained models are available at http://github.com/Hadisalman/ smoothing-adversarial.
Introduction
Neural networks have been very successful in tasks such as image classification and speech recognition, but have been shown to be extremely brittle to small, adversarially-chosen perturbations of their inputs [30, 13] . A classifier (e.g., a neural network), which correctly classifies an image x, can be fooled by an adversary to misclassify x + δ where δ is an adversarial perturbation so small that x and x + δ are indistinguishable for the human eye. Recently, many works have proposed heuristic defenses intended to train models robust to such adversarial perturbations. However, most of these defenses were broken using more powerful adversaries [4, 2, 32] . This encouraged researchers to develop defenses that lead to certifiably robust classifiers, i.e., whose predictions for most of the test examples x can be verified to be constant within a neighborhood of x [36, 25] . Unfortunately, these techniques do not immediately scale to large neural networks that are used in practice.
To mitigate this limitation of prior certifiable defenses, a number of papers [19, 20, 5] consider the randomized smoothing approach, which transforms any classifier f (e.g., a neural network) into a new smoothed classifier g that has certifiable 2 -norm robustness guarantees. This transformation works as follows.
Let f be an arbitrary base classifier which maps inputs in R d to classes in Y. Given an input x, the smoothed classifier g(x) labels x as having class c which is the most likely to be returned by the base classifier f when fed a noisy corruption x + δ, where δ ∼ N (x, σ 2 I) is a vector sampled according to an isotropic Gaussian distribution.
As shown in [5] , one can derive certifiable robustness for such smoothed classifiers via the NeymanPearson lemma. They demonstrate that for 2 perturbations, randomized smoothing outperforms other certifiably robust classifiers that have been previously proposed. It is scalable to networks with any architecture and size, which makes it suitable for building robust real-world neural networks. Our contributions In this paper, we employ adversarial training to substantially improve on the previous certified robustness results of randomized smoothing [19, 20, 5] . We present, for the first time, a direct attack for smoothed classifiers. We then demonstrate how to use this attack to adversarially train smoothed models with not only boosted empirical robustness but also substantially improved certifiable robustness using the certification method of Cohen et al. [5] .
We demonstrate that our method outperforms all existing provably 2 -robust classifiers by a significant margin on ImageNet and CIFAR-10, establishing the state-of-the-art for provable 2 -defenses. For instance, our Resnet-50 ImageNet classifier achieves 56% provable top-1 accuracy (compared to the best previous provable accuracy of 49%) under adversarial perturbations with 2 norm less than 127/255. Similarly, our Resnet-110 CIFAR-10 classifier achieves up to 16% improvement over previous state-of-the-art. Our main results are reported in Tables 1 and 2 for ImageNet and CIFAR-10.
Our techniques
Here, we describe our techniques for adversarial attacks and training on smoothed classifiers. We first require some background on randomized smoothing classifiers. For a more detailed description of randomized smoothing, see Cohen et al. [5] .
Background on randomized smoothing
Consider a classifier f from R d to classes Y. Randomized smoothing is a method that constructs a new, smoothed classifier g from the base classifier f . The smoothed classifier g assigns to a query point x the class which is most likely to be returned by the base classifier f under isotropic Gaussian noise perturbation of x, i.e., g(x) = arg max c∈Y P(f (x + δ) = c) where δ ∼ N (0, σ 2 I) .
The noise level σ 2 is a hyperparameter of the smoothed classifier g which controls a robustness/accuracy tradeoff. Equivalently, this means that g(x) returns the class c whose decision region {x ∈ R d : f (x ) = c} has the largest measure under the distribution N (x, σ 2 I). Cohen et al. [5] recently presented a tight robustness guarantee for the smoothed classifier g and gave Monte Carlo algorithms for certifying the robustness of g around x or predicting the class of x using g, that succeed with high probability. This guarantee can in fact be obtained alternatively by explicitly computing the Lipschitz constant of the smoothed classifier, as we do in Appendix A.
Robustness guarantee for smoothed classifiers The robustness guarantee presented by [5] is as follows: suppose that when the base classifier f classifies N (x, σ 2 I), the class c A is returned with probability p A = P(f (x + δ) = c A ), and the "runner-up" class c B is returned with probability p B = max c =c A P(f (x + δ) = c). The smoothed classifier g is robust around x within the radius
where Φ −1 is the inverse of the standard Gaussian CDF. It is not clear how to compute p A and p B exactly (if f is given by a deep neural network for example). Monte Carlo sampling is used to estimate some p A and p B for which p A ≤ p A and p B ≥ p B with arbitrarily high probability over the samples. The result of (2) still holds if we replace p A with p A and p B with p B .
SMOOTHADV: Attacking smoothed classifiers
We now describe our attack against smoothed classifiers. To do so, it will first be useful to describe smoothed classifiers in a more general setting. Specifically, we consider a generalization of (1) to soft classifiers, namely, functions F : R d → P (Y), where P (Y) is the set of probability distributions over Y. Neural networks typically learn such soft classifiers, then use the argmax of the soft classifier as the final hard classifier. Given a soft classifier F , its associated smoothed soft classifier G : R n → P (Y) is defined as G(x) = F * N (0, σ 2 I) (x) = E δ∼N (0,σ 2 I)
[F (x + δ)] .
Let f (x) and F (x) denote the hard and soft classifiers learned by the neural network, respectively, and let g and G denote the associated smoothed hard and smoothed soft classifiers. Directly finding adversarial examples for the smoothed hard classifier g is a somewhat ill-behaved problem because of the argmax, so we instead propose to find adversarial examples for the smoothed soft classifier G. Empirically we found that doing so will also find good adversarial examples for the smoothed hard classifier. More concretely, given a labeled data point (x, y), we wish to find a pointx which maximizes the loss of G in an 2 ball around x for some choice of loss function. As is canonical in the literature, we focus on the cross entropy loss CE . Thus, given a labeled data point (x, y) our (ideal) adversarial perturbation is given by the formula:
We will refer to (S) as the SMOOTHADV objective. The SMOOTHADV objective is highly non-convex, so as is common in the literature, we will optimize it via projected gradient descent (PGD), and variants thereof. It is hard to find exact gradients for (S), so in practice we must use some estimator based on random Gaussian samples. There are a number of different natural estimators for the derivative of the objective function in (S), and the choice of estimator can dramatically change the performance of the attack. For more details, see Section 3.
We note that (S) should not be confused with the similar-looking objectivê
as suggested in section G.3 of [5] . There is a subtle, but very important, distinction between (S) and (4). Conceptually, solving (4) corresponds to finding an adversarial example of F that is robust to Gaussian noise. In contrast, (S) is directly attacking the smoothed model i.e. trying to find adversarial examples that decrease the probability of correct classification of the smoothed soft classifier G. From this point of view, (S) is the right optimization problem that should be used to find adversarial examples of G. This distinction turns out to be crucial in practice: empirically, Cohen et al. [5] found attacks based on (4) not to be effective.
Interestingly, for a large class of classifiers, including neural networks, one can alternatively derive the objective (S) from an optimization perspective, by attempting to directly find adversarial examples to the smoothed hard classifier that the neural network provides. While they ultimately yield the same objective, this perspective may also be enlightening, and so we include it in Appendix B.
Adversarial training using SMOOTHADV
We now wish to use our new attack to boost the adversarial robustness of smoothed classifiers. We do so using the well-studied adversarial training framework [18, 23] . In adversarial training, given a current set of model weights w t and a labeled data point (x t , y t ), one finds an adversarial perturbation x t of x t for the current model w t , and then takes a gradient step for the model parameters, evaluated at the point (x t , y t ). Intuitively, this encourages the network to learn to minimize the worst-case loss over a neighborhood around the input.
At a high level, we propose to instead do adversarial training using an adversarial example for the smoothed classifier. We combine this with the approach suggested in Cohen et al. [5] , and train at Gaussian perturbations of this adversarial example. That is, given current set of weights w t and a labeled data point (x t , y t ), we findx t as a solution to (S), and then take a gradient step for w t based at gaussian perturbations ofx t . In contrast to standard adversarial training, we are training the base classifier so that its associated smoothed classifier minimizes worst-case loss in a neighborhood around the current point. For more details of our implementation, see Section 3.2. We emphasize that although we are training using adversarial examples for the smoothed soft classifier, in the end we certify the robustness of the smoothed hard classifier we obtain after training.
We make two important observations about our method. First, adversarial training is an empirical defense, and typically offers no provable guarantees. However, we demonstrate that by combining our formulation of adversarial training with randomized smoothing, we are able to substantially boost the certifiable robust accuracy of our smoothed classifiers. Thus, while adversarial training using SMOOTHADV is still ultimately a heuristic, and offers no provable robustness by itself, the smoothed classifier that we obtain using this heuristic has strong certifiable guarantees.
Second, we found empirically that to obtain strong certifiable numbers using randomized smoothing, it is insufficient to use standard adversarial training on the base classifier. While such adversarial training does indeed offer good empirical robust accuracy, the resulting classifier is not optimized for randomized smoothing. In contrast, our method specifically finds base classifiers whose smoothed counterparts are robust. As a result, the certifiable numbers for standard adversarial training are noticeably worse than those obtained using our method. See Appendix C.1 for an in-depth comparison.
3 Implementing SMOOTHADV via first order methods
As mentioned above, it is difficult to optimize the SMOOTHADV objective, so we will approximate it via first order methods. We focus on two such methods: the well-studied projected gradient descent (PGD) method [18, 23] , and the recently proposed decoupled direction and norm (DDN) method [27] which achieves 2 robust accuracy competitive with PGD on CIFAR-10.
The main task when implementing these methods is to, given a data point (x, y), compute the gradient of the objective function in (S) with respect to x . If we let J(x ) = CE (G(x ), y) denote the objective function in (S), we have
However, it is not clear how to evaluate (5) exactly, as it takes the form of a complicated high dimensional integral. Therefore, we will use Monte Carlo approximations. We sample i.i.d. Gaussians δ 1 , . . . , δ m ∼ N (0, σ 2 I), and use the plug-in estimator for the expectation:
It is not hard to see that if F is smooth, this estimator will converge to (5) as we take more samples. In practice, if we take m samples, then to evaluate (6) on all m samples requires evaluating the network m times. This becomes expensive for large m, especially if we want to plug this into the adversarial training framework, which is already slow. Thus, when we use this for adversarial training, we use m train ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}. When we run this attack to evaluate the empirical adversarial accuracy of our models, we use substantially larger choices of m, specifically, m test ∈ {1, 4, 8, 16, 64, 128}. Empirically we found that increasing m beyond 128 did not substantially improve performance.
While this estimator does converge to the true gradient given enough samples, note that it is not an unbiased estimator for the gradient. Despite this, we found that using (6) performs very well in practice. Indeed, using (6) yields our strongest empirical attacks, as well as our strongest certifiable defenses when we use this attack in adversarial training. In the remainder of the paper, we let SMOOTHADV PGD denote the PGD attack with gradient steps given by (6) , and similarly we let SMOOTHADV DDN denote the DDN attack with gradient steps given by (6).
An unbiased, gradient free method
We note that there is an alternative way to optimize (S) using first order methods. Notice that the logarithm in (S) does not change the argmax, and so it suffices to find a minimizer of G(x ) y subject
Updatex (j) according to the k-th step of ATTACKER, where we use the noise samples δ
m to estimate a gradient of the loss of the smoothed model according to (6) # We are reusing the same noise samples between different steps of the attack end
to L # Again, we are reusing the same noise samples for the augmentation end Run backpropagation on L with an appropriate learning rate to the 2 constraint. We then observe that
The equality (a) is known as Stein's lemma [29], although we note that something similar can be derived for more general distributions. There is a natural unbiased estimator for (7): sample i.i.d. gaussians δ 1 , . . . , δ m ∼ N (0, σ 2 I), and form the estimator
This estimator has a number of nice properties. As mentioned previously, it is an unbiased estimator for (7) , in contrast to (6) . It also requires no computations of the gradient of F ; if F is a neural network, this saves both time and memory by not storing preactivations during the forward pass. Finally, it is very general: the derivation of (7) actually holds even if F is a hard classifier (or more precisely, the one-hot embedding of a hard classifier). In particular, this implies that this technique can even be used to directly find adversarial examples of the smoothed hard classifier.
Despite these appealing features, in practice we find that this attack is quite weak. We speculate that this is because the variance of the gradient estimator is too high. For this reason, in the empirical evaluation we focus on attacks using (6), but we believe that investigating this attack in practice is an interesting direction for future work. See Appendix C.6 for more details.
Implementing adversarial training for smoothed classifiers
We incorporate adversarial training into the approach of Cohen et al. [5] changing as few moving parts as possible in order to enable a direct comparison. In particular, we use the same network architectures, batch size, and learning rate schedule. For CIFAR-10, we change the number of epochs, but for ImageNet, we leave it the same. We discuss more of these specifics in Appendix D, and here we describe how to perform adversarial training on a single mini-batch. The algorithm is shown in Pseudocode 1, with the following parameters: B is the mini-batch size, m is the number of noise samples used for gradient estimation in (6) as well as for Gaussian noise data augmentation, and T is the number of steps of an attack 2 .
Experiments
We primarily compare with Cohen et al. [5] as it was shown to outperform all other scalable provable 2 defenses by a wide margin.
As our experiments will demonstrate, our method consistently and significantly outperforms Cohen et al. [5] even further, establishing the state-of-the-art for provable 2 -defenses. We run experiments on ImageNet [7] and CIFAR- 10 [17] . We use the same base classifiers f as Cohen et al. [5] : a ResNet-50 [15] on ImageNet, and ResNet-110 on CIFAR-10. Other than the choice of attack (SMOOTHADV PGD or SMOOTHADV DDN ) for adversarial training, [5] . Subfigure captions are same as Fig. 1 . Details of each model used to generate these plots and their certified accuracies are in Table 3 in Appendix E. our experiments are distinguished based on four main hyperparameters:
= maximum allowed 2 perturbation of the input T = number of steps of the attack σ = std. of Gaussian noise data augmentation during training and certification mtrain = number of noise samples used to estimate (6) during training mtest = number of noise samples used to estimate (6) during evaluation (♦) Given a smoothed classifier g, we use the same prediction and certification algorithms, PREDICT and CERTIFY, as [5] . Both algorithms sample base classifier predictions under Gaussian noise. PREDICT outputs the majority vote if the vote count passes a binomial hypothesis test, and abstains otherwise. CERTIFY certifies the majority vote is robust if the fraction of such votes is higher by a calculated margin than the fraction of the next most popular votes, and abstains otherwise. For details of these algorithms, we refer the reader to [5] .
The certified accuracy at radius r is defined as the fraction of the test set which g classifies correctly (without abstaining) and certifies robust at an 2 radius r. Unless otherwise specified, we use the same σ for certification as the one used for training the base classifier f . Note that g is a randomized smoothing classifier, so this reported accuracy is approximate, but can get arbitrarily close to the true certified accuracy as the number of samples of g increases (see [5] for more details). Similarly, the empirical accuracy is defined as the fraction of the 2 SMOOTHADV-ersarially attacked test set which g classifies correctly (without abstaining).
Both PREDICT and CERTIFY have a parameter α defining the failure rate of these algorithms. Throughout the paper, we set α = 0.001 (similar to [5] ), which means there is at most a 0.1% chance that PREDICT does not return the most probable class under the smoothed classifier g, or that CERTIFY falsely certifies a non-robust input.
SMOOTHADV-ersarial training
To assess the effectiveness of our method, we learn a smoothed classifier g that is adversarial trained using (S). Then we compute the certified accuracies over a range of 2 radii r. Tables 1 and 2 report the certified accuracies using our method compared to [5] . For all radii, we outperform the certified accuracies of [5] by a significant margin on both ImageNet and CIFAR-10. These results are elaborated below.
For CIFAR-10 Fig. 1 (left) plots the upper envelope of the certified accuracies that we get by choosing the best model for each radius over a grid of hyperparameters. This grid consists of m train ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}, σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0}, ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0} (see ♦ for explanation), and one of the following attacks {SMOOTHADV PGD , SMOOTHADV DDN } with T ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10} steps. The certified accuracies of each model can be found in Tables 4-12 in Appendix E. These results are compared to those of Cohen et al. [5] by plotting their reported certified accuracies. Fig. 1 (left) also plots the corresponding empirical accuracies using SMOOTHADV PGD with m test = 128. Note that our certified accuracies are higher than the empirical accuracies of Cohen et al. [5] . Fig. 1 (middle) plots our vs [5] 's best models for varying noise level σ. Fig. 1 (right) plots a representative model for each σ from our adversarially trained models. Observe that we outperform [5] in all three plots.
For ImageNet
The results are summarized in Fig. 2 , which is similar to Fig. 1 for CIFAR-10, with the difference being the set of smoothed models we certify. This set includes smoothed models trained using m train = 1, σ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0}, ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0}, and one of the following attacks {1-step SMOOTHADV PGD , 2-step SMOOTHADV DDN }. Again, our models outperform those of Cohen et al. [5] overall and per σ as well. The certified accuracies of each model can be found in Table 3 in Appendix E.
We point out, as mentioned by Cohen et al. [5] , that σ controls a robustness/accuracy trade-off. When σ is low, small radii can be certified with high accuracy, but large radii cannot be certified at all. When σ is high, larger radii can be certified, but smaller radii are certified at a lower accuracy. This can be observed in the middle and the right plots of Fig. 1 
and 2.
Effect on clean accuracy Training smoothed classifers using SMOOTHADV as shown improves upon the certified accuracy of Cohen et al. [5] for each σ, although this comes with the well-known effect of adversarial training in decreasing the standard accuracy, so we sometimes see small drops in the accuracy at r = 0, as observed in Fig. 1 
(right) and 2(right).
Additional experiments and observations We compare the effectiveness of smoothed classifiers when they are trained SMOOTHADV-versarially vs. when their base classifier is trained via standard adversarial training (we will refer to the latter as vanilla adversarial training). As expected, because the training objective of SMOOTHADV-models aligns with the actual certification objective, those models achieve noticeably more certified robustness over all radii compared to smoothed classifiers resulting from vanilla adversarial training. We defer the results and details to Appendix C.1.
Furthermore, SMOOTHADV requires the evaluation of (6) as discussed in Section 3. We analyze in Appendix C.2 how the number of Gaussian noise samples m train , used in (6) to find adversarial examples, affects the robustness of the resulting smoothed models. As expected, we observe that models trained with higher m train tend to have higher certified accuracies.
Finally, we analyze the effect of the maximum allowed 2 perturbation used in SMOOTHADV on the robustness of smoothed models in Appendix C.3.
Attacking trained models with SMOOTHADV
In this section, we assess the performance of our attack, particularly SMOOTHADV PGD , for finding adversarial examples for the CIFAR-10 randomized smoothing models of Cohen et al. [5] .
SMOOTHADV PGD requires the evaluation of (6) as discussed in Section 3. Here, we analyze how sensitive our attack is to the number of samples m test used in (6) for estimating the gradient of the adversarial objective. Fig. 3 shows the empirical accuracies for various values of m test . Lower accuracies corresponds to stronger attack. SMOOTHADV with m test = 1 sample performs worse than the vanilla PGD attack on the base classifier, but as m test increases, our attack becomes stronger, decreasing the gap between certified and empirical accuracies. We did not observe any noticeable improvement beyond m test = 128. More details are in Appendix C.4.
While as discussed here, the success rate of the attack is affected by the number of Gaussian noise samples m test used by the attacker, it is also affected by the number of Gaussian noise samples n in PREDICT used by the classifier. Indeed, as n increases, abstention due to low confidence becomes more rare, increasing the prediction quality of the smoothed classifier. See a detailed analysis in Appendix C.5. [5] 's models on CIFAR-10. For each 2 radius r, the certified/empirical accuracy is the maximum over randomized smoothing models trained using σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0}. The empirical accuracies are found using 20 steps of SMOOTHADV PGD . The closer an empirical curve is to the certified curve, the stronger the corresponding attack is (the lower the better).
Related Work
Recently, many approaches (defenses) have been proposed to build adversarially robust classifiers, and these approaches can be broadly divided into empirical defenses and certified defenses.
Empirical defenses are empirically robust to existing adversarial attacks, and the best empirical defense so far is adversarial training [18, 23] . In this kind of defense, a neural network is trained to minimize the worst-case loss over a neighborhood around the input. Although such defenses seem powerful, nothing guarantees that a more powerful, not yet known, attack would not break them; the most that can be said is that known attacks are unable to find adversarial examples around the data points. In fact, most empirical defenses proposed in the literature were later "broken" by stronger adversaries [4, 2, 32, 1] . To stop this arms race between defenders and attackers, a number of work tried to focus on building certified defenses which enjoy formal robustness guarantees.
Certified defenses are provably robust to a specific class of adversarial perturbation, and can guarantee that for any input x, the classifier's prediction is constant within a neighborhood of x. These are typically based on certification methods which are either exact (a.k.a "complete") or conservative (a.k.a "sound but incomplete"). Exact methods, usually based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories solvers [16, 10] or mixed integer linear programming [31, 22, 11] , are guaranteed to find an adversarial example around a datapoint if it exists. Unfortunately, they are computationally inefficient and difficult to scale up to large neural networks. Conservative methods are also guaranteed to detect an adversarial example if exists, but they might mistakenly flag a safe data point as vulnerable to adversarial examples. On the bright side, these methods are more scalable and efficient which makes some of them useful for building certified defenses [36, 33, 34, 25, 26, 37, 9, 8, 6, 12, 24, 28, 14, 35, 38] . However, none of them have yet been shown to scale to practical networks that are large and expressive enough to perform well on ImageNet, for example. To scale up to practical networks, randomized smoothing has been proposed as a probabilistically certified defense.
Randomized smoothing A randomized smoothing classifier is not itself a neural network, but uses a neural network as its base for classification. Randomized smoothing was proposed by several works [21, 3] as a heuristic defense without proving any guarantees. Lecuyer et al. [19] first proved robustness guarantees for randomized smoothing classifier, utilizing inequalities from the differential privacy literature. Subsequently, Li et al.
[20] gave a stronger robustness guarantee using tools from information theory. Recently, Cohen et al. [5] provided a tight robustness guarantee for randomized smoothing and consequently achieved the state of the art in 2 -norm certified defense.
Conclusions
In this paper, we designed an adapted attack for smoothed classifiers, and we showed how this attack can be used in an adversarial training setting to substantially improve the provable robustness of smoothed classifiers. We demonstrated through extensive experimentation that our adversarially trained smooth classifiers consistently outperforms all existing provably 2 -robust classifiers by a significant margin on ImageNet and CIFAR-10, establishing the state of the art for provable 2 -defenses. 
Proof. It suffices to prove that for any unit direction u one has u · ∇f (x) ≤ 2 π . Note that:
and thus (using |f (t)| ≤ 1, and classical integration of the Gaussian density)
A very nice observation of Cohen et al. [5] is that the functionf actually satisfies a stronger smoothness property:
Proof. Note that:
and thus we need to prove that for any unit direction u, denoting p =f (x),
Note that the left-hand side can be written as follows (recall (8))
Invoking a simple symmetry argument, one can actually compute the supremum of the above quantity over all functions f : R n → [0, 1], subject to the constraint that E[f (x + X)] = p, namely it is equal to:
thus concluding the proof.
Both lemmas give the same robustness guarantee for small gaps, but the second lemma is much better for large gaps (in fact, in the limit of a gap going to 1, the second lemma gives an infinite radius while the first lemma only gives a radius of π 2 ).
B Another perspective for deriving SMOOTHADV
In this section we provide an alternative motivation for the SMOOTHADV objective presented in Section 2.2. We assume that we have a hard classifier f :
If f is a neural network classifier, this L can be taken for instance to be the map from the input to the logit layer immediately preceding the softmax. If f is of this form, then the smoothed soft classifier g with parameter σ 2 associated to (the one-hot encoding of) f can be written has g(x) y = Pr
for all y ∈ Y, where ν :
βzy / y ∈Y e βz y . Observe that for any z ∈ R Y , we have that ζ β (z) → ν(z) as β → ∞. Thus we can approximate (9) with
To find an adversarial perturbation of g at data point (x, y), it is sufficient to find a perturbationx so that g(x) y is minimized. Combining this with the approximation (10), we find that a heuristic to find an adversarial example for the smoothed classifier at (x, y) is to solve the following optimization problem:x = arg min
and as we let β → ∞, this converges to finding an adversarial example for the true smoothed classifier.
To conclude, we simply observe that for neural networks, ζ β (L(x + δ)) y is exactly the soft classifier that is thresholded to form the hard classifier, if β is taken to be 1. Therefore the solution to (S) and (11) with β = 1 are the same, since log is a monotonic function.
An interesting direction is to investigate whether varying β in (11) allows us to improve our adversarial attacks, and if they do, whether this gives us stronger adversarial training as well. Intuitively, as we take β → ∞, the quality of the optimal solution should increase, but the optimization problem becomes increasingly ill-behaved, and so it is not clear if the actual solution we obtain to this problem via first order methods becomes better or not.
C Additional Experiments C.1 Adversarial attacking the base model instead of the smoothed model
We compare SMOOTHADV-ersarial training (training the smoothed classifier g) to:
1. using vanilla adversarial training (PGD) to find adversarial examples of the base classifier f and train on them. We refer to this as Vanilla PGD training. 2. using vanilla adversarial training (PGD) to find adversarial examples of the base classifier f , add Gaussian noise to them, then train on the resulting inputs. We refer to this as Vanilla PGD+noise training.
For our method and the above two methods, we use T = 2 steps of attack, m train = 1, and we train for ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0}, and for σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0}. 
C.3 Effect of during training on the certified accuracy of smoothed classifiers
Here, we analyze the effect of the maximum allowed 2 perturbation of SMOOTHADV during adversarial training on the robustness of the obtained smoothed classifier. Fig. 6 plots the best certified accuracies for ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0} over models trained using SMOOTHADV PGD with T ∈ {2, 4, 6, 8, 10}, m train ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8}, and σ ∈ {0.12, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0}. Observe that as increases, the certified accuracies for small 2 radii decrease, but those for large 2 radii increase, which is expected. 
C.6 Performance of the gradient-free estimator (7)
Despite the appealing features of the gradient-free estimator (7) presented in Section 3.1 as an alternative to (6) , in practice we find that this attack is quite weak. This is shown in Fig. 8 for various values of m test .
We speculate that this is because the variance of the gradient estimator is too high. We believe that investigating this attack in practice is an interesting direction for future work. (7), m test = 4 Eq. (7), m test = 8 Eq. (7), m test = 16 Eq. (7), m test = 64 Eq. (7), m test = 128 Eq. (7), m test = 256 Eq. (7), m test = 512 Figure 8 : The emprirical accuracies found by the attack (S) using the plug-in estimator (6) vs. the gradient-free estimator (7). The closer an empirical curve is to the certified curve, the stronger the attack.
D Experiments Details
Here we include details of all the experiments conducted in this paper.
Attacks used in the paper We use two of the strongest attacks in the literature, projected gradient descent (PGD) [23] and decoupled direction and norm (DDN) [27] attacks. We adapt these attacks such that their gradient steps are given by (6), and we call the resulting attacks SMOOTHADV PGD and SMOOTHADV DDN , respectively.
For PGD (SMOOTHADV PGD ), we use a constant step size γ = 2 T where T is the number of attack steps, and is the maximum allowed 2 perturbation of the input.
For DDN (SMOOTHADV DDN ), the attack objective is in fact different than that of PGD (i.e. different that (S)). DDN tries to find the "closest" adversarial example to the input instead of finding the "best" adversarial example (in terms of maximizing the loss in a given neighborhood of the input). We stick to the hyperparameters used in the original paper [27] . We use 0 = 1, γ = 0.05, and an initial step size α = 1 that is reduced with cosine annealing to 0.01 in the last iteration (see [27] for the definition of these parameters). We experimented with very few iterations ({2, 4, 6, 8, 10}) as compared to the original paper, but we still got good results.
We emphasize that we are not using PGD and DDN to attack the base classifer f of a smoothed model, instead we are using them to adversarially train smoothed classiers (see Pseudocode 1).
Training details In order to report certified radii in the original coordinates, we first added Gaussian noise and/or do adversarial attacks, and then standardized the data (in contrast to importing a standardized dataset). Specifically, in our PyTorch implementation, the first layer of the base classifier is a normalization layer that performed a channel-wise standardization of its input.
For both ImageNet and CIFAR-10, we trained the base classifier with random horizontal flips and random crops (in addition to the Gaussian data augmentation discussed in Section 3.2).
The main training algorithm is shown in Pseudocode 1. It has the following parameters: B is the mini-batch size, m is the number of noise samples used for gradient estimation in (6) as well as for Gaussian noise data augmentation, and T is the number of steps of an attack.
We point out few remarks.
1. First, an important parameter is the radius of the attack . During the first epoch, it is set to zero, then we linearly increase it over the first ten epochs, then it stays constant. 2. Second, we are reusing the same noise samples during every step of our attack as well as augmentation. Intuitively, it helps to stabilize the attack process. 3. Finally, the way training is described in Pseudocode 1 is not efficient; it needs to be appropriately batched so that we compute adversarial examples for every input in a batch at the same time.
Compute details and training time On CIFAR-10, we trained using SGD on one NVIDIA P100 GPU. We train for 150 epochs. We use a batch size of 256, and an initial learning rate of 0.1 which drops by a factor of 10 every 50 epochs. Training time varies between few hours to few days, depending on how many attack steps T and noise samples m are used in Pseudocode 1.
On ImageNet we trained with synchronous SGD on four NVIDIA V100 GPUs. We train for 90 epochs. We use a batch size of 400, and an initial learning rate of 0.1 which drops by a factor of 10 every 30 epochs. Training time varies between 2 to 6 days depending on whether we are doining SMOOTHADV-ersarial training or just Gaussian noise training (similar to Cohen et al. [5] ).
Models used The models used in this paper are similar to those used in Cohen et al. [5] : a ResNet-50 [15] on ImageNet, and ResNet-110 on CIFAR-10. These models can be found on the github repo accompanying [5] https://github.com/locuslab/smoothing/blob/master/ code/architectures.py.
Parameters of CERTIFY amd PREDICT For details of these algorithms, please see the Pseudocode in [5] .
For CERTIFY, unless otherwise specified, we use n = 100, 000, n 0 = 100, α = 0.001.
For PREDICT, unless otherwise specified, we use n = 100, 000 and α = 0.001.
Source code Our code and trained models are publicly available at http://github.com/ Hadisalman/smoothing-adversarial. The repository also includes all our training/certification logs, which enables the replication of all the results of this paper by running a single piece of code. Check the repository for more details.
E ImageNet and CIFAR-10 Detailed Results
In this appendix, we include the certified accuracies of each mode that we use in the paper. For each 2 radius, we highlight the best accuracy accross all models. Note that we outperform the models of Cohen et al. [5] (first three rows of each table) over all 2 radii by wide margins. 
